Non-traded REITs are registered investment companies marketed to retail investors. We find that returns to 81 non-traded REITs which had listed, been acquired by or merged with a listed REIT or had updated per share values average 6.3% annually compared to 11.6% returns earned over the same period in traded REITs. The economic magnitude of the underperformance is over $45 billion. A significant portion of non-traded REITs' underperformance results from high upfront fees and expenses, which average 13.2%, and largely serve to compensate brokers. Conflicts of interest permeate the structure of non-traded REITs, which typically use affiliated firms as advisors and managers.
I. Introduction
Non-traded REITs are one type of Direct Participation Program (DPP) marketed primarily to retail investors by independent broker/dealer networks. REITs receive from selling DRP shares. Non-traded REITs frequently change the rules to reduce the size of SRPs over time, generally reducing the fraction of DRP proceeds that may be used to redeem shares. These rules effectively prohibit investors from selling their shares prior to a liquidity event.
Traded REITs enjoy the same tax-advantages as non-traded REITs but have better liquidity since they are listed on a major stock exchange. Given that traded REITs have the same investment opportunities and regulatory and tax treatment as non-traded REITs, traded REITs provide a natural benchmark against which to evaluate the investment performance of non-traded REITs. We use an investable mutual fund that invests in traded REITs so our traded REIT returns already account for fees and transactions costs. We find that had non-traded REIT investors instead invested in a low-cost and liquid REIT mutual fund they would have accumulated $45.5 billion more than they accumulated in the nontraded REITs. Non-traded REITs' average annual returns are 6.3%, compared to 11.6% in the traded REIT portfolio.
Our comparison of non-traded REIT returns to those of traded REITs understates the true opportunity cost of investing in non-traded REITs for two reasons. First, nontraded REIT investments have limited liquidity prior to a liquidity event. Non-traded REIT secondary market liquidity is primarily the Share Repurchase Programs (SRP), often limited to some fraction of investors' participation in the Dividend Reinvestment Program (DRP). 4 Non-traded REITs typically purchase shares at a fraction of their value and impose fees on sales, which make liquidations costly. Investors require higher returns for investing in illiquid investments (Amihud 2002 and Pastor and Stambaugh 2003) . Given their illiquidity, non-traded REITs should have higher returns than their traded, liquid counterparts. Second, we compare the returns to non-traded REITs with the returns to a large, diversified REIT mutual fund that holds more than 100 traded REITs. Given the lack of mark-to-market returns it is impossible to know how much more volatile the returns to the individual non-traded REITs are than our benchmark but the average standard deviation of 4 Non-traded REITs frequently alter the rules of their SRPs in ways that further limit the amount of capital available for share repurchases.
daily returns across the individual traded REITs in our benchmark is 40% greater than the standard deviation of the fund's daily returns.
After documenting the non-traded REIT return shortfalls relative to traded REITs, we investigate the determinants of those shortfalls. We begin with the upfront costs levied on the investors at the time of non-traded REIT share purchases, which average 13.2% and range from 9% to 16% across our sample. We estimate the contribution of these fees to the shortfalls by determining the future value as of the liquidation date of the money that investors paid in fees when acquiring non-traded REIT shares. We find that fees account for approximately 56% of the return shortfalls.
In addition to levying high upfront fees, non-traded REITs have organizational structures that are laced with conflicts of interest. These conflicts of interest include advisors and portfolio managers with poorly aligned incentives, property transactions with related parties, and governance structures ensuring absolute power and discretion to the sponsor. These conflicts are disclosed in offering documents filed with the U.S. SEC and should be cause for concern to any financial advisor exercising due diligence.
We investigate the contribution of conflicts of interest to the underperformance of non-traded REITs by examining changes in expenses, focusing on payments to sponsoraffiliated advisors and managers, around the time non-traded REITs list their shares for trading on an exchange. We show that the overwhelming fraction of listings closely coincide with the separation of the sponsor from advisory and managerial roles. We observe corresponding reductions in expenses of approximately 9.0% of annual revenues, which are primarily driven by the reduction in expenses paid to affiliates of the sponsor.
Previous research found that institutional owners perform monitoring roles when investing in traded REITs, and that they are able to ameliorate the potentially harmful effects of conflicts of interest. Unlike their traded counterparts, non-traded REITs almost never have institutional investors. 5 The first disclosed institutional holdings occur in the months following the internalization of advisory and managerial roles and exchange 5 We define large investor as one owning at least 5% of the outstanding shares, at which point they are required to disclose their position under SEC Rule 13.
listings. Institutional ownership is clearly not an effective monitoring mechanism in nontraded REITs, consistent with our observation that conflicts of interest permeate non-traded REITs and adversely impact investor returns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the sample of 81 non-traded REITs and describes our empirical approach and construction of the dataset. Section III presents the main results comparing non-traded REIT returns to traded REIT returns. Section IV investigates the role of conflicts of interest in non-traded REIT organizational structures, and Section V concludes briefly.
II. Sample Description and Research Design a. Sample Description
The sample includes 81 non-traded REITs that have reported updated share prices an exchange and the other 23 merged with or were acquired by a traded REIT. The time from initial offering to a liquidity event ranged from 1.5 years to 13.5 years and averaged 6.6 years.
6 FINRA requires REITs to provide an updated estimate of the REIT's NAV per share at least once per year Non-traded REIT investors pay large up-front fees which dramatically reduces the capital available to purchase portfolio holdings. The up-front fees in the non-traded REITs listed in Table 1 range from 9% to 16% and average 13.2%. The majority of these fees are paid as compensation to brokers and advisors for selling REIT shares. Those sales commissions average 6.8%. The balance is allocated among "other fees" (4.3%), property acquisition fees (2.1%), and reserve fees (0.2%). Very few broker-sold mutual funds charge more than a 5% sales load and mutual fund breakpoints ensure sales loads decline significantly with the size of an investment. By comparison, the average up-front fees charged to non-traded REIT investors (13.2%), is a full 5.0% greater than the maximum allowable mutual fund front-end load.
b. Research Design
To quantitatively evaluate the performance of non-traded REIT investments, we construct a full history of non-affiliated investors' capital flows for each non-traded REIT.
These capital flows begin on the effective date of the initial share offering for each sample non-traded REIT, and consist of all share purchases and re-invested dividends.
Distributions include the portion of dividend payments not re-invested through DRPs plus the amount investors receive when they sell shares through SRPs.
We compare the value of unaffiliated investors' shares in non-traded REITs at the time of each liquidity event or last share value update to the value of a traded REIT portfolio that would have cost exactly the same amount to purchase as the shares in the non-traded REITs. 7 To determine the liquidation amount, we assume all non-affiliated investors liquidate their shares on the first date they are able to do so through a merger, 7 An alternative approach is that of Seguin (2012) who uses financial statement analysis of traded and nontraded REITs to compute implied market valuations of NTRs. Our approach differs by focusing on returnsbased evidence as a direct measure of investor performance.
acquisition, or exchange listing or at the latest share value update if the REIT is still nontraded but has published an updated share value. The benchmark amount that we use for comparison is the value non-traded REIT investors would have amassed had they instead invested the same net inflows and outflows in a low-cost mutual fund of traded REITs.
Additionally, we compare the annualized rate of return generated by the non-traded REIT investment against the returns of the same investments in the traded REIT mutual fund.
The first step to our approach is to estimate the timing and magnitude of unaffiliated investors' share purchases and participation in the dividend reinvestment programs in each sample non-traded REIT. We next determine the cash flows back out to investors in the form of redemptions and dividends that are not reinvested. We construct the capital flow data series for each sample non-traded REIT by analyzing the financial statements contained in 10-K, 10-Q, and 424(b) filings. The SEC filings provide additional details which are used in the analysis, such as the dates that offerings commence and conclude, the number of shares issued and clues to the timing of the cash flows.
The Statements of Cash Flows provide details on the amount of capital raised from equity sales during each period. The statements themselves provide the amount raised and corresponding notes frequently identify the amount raised from affiliated and unaffiliated investors over time. In cases where we do not find any reference to shares purchased by affiliates or related parties, we assume all of the shares were purchased by non-affiliates.
The statement notes provide additional details as to whether the equity proceeds are reported net or gross of fees. For the purposes of return comparisons, we track investments gross of fees so they reflect the total cash paid by investors.
In addition to the amount of capital raised from investors each period, we also track dividend distributions paid to investors, the amount investors reinvest through DRPs, and The next step is to determine the timing of the cash flows. Although the 10-K's only provide one data point per year, we improve our timing estimates by examining 424b3s filed by the non-traded REITs between their 10-K filings. These forms are filed sporadically, and often disclose total gross proceeds accumulated from the first capital raise to a specified date in the 424b3. We assume that the REIT raises cash from investors evenly over time between the 424b3 and 10-K dates.
Dividend payment dates from 10-K filings frequently indicate that dividends are paid quarterly. For non-traded REITs that disclose total dividends only once a year rather than each dividend payment, we assume that the dividend is the same in all four quartersor in all twelve months if the REIT pays monthly dividends. Since share repurchases are reported in financial statements only, we assume the non-traded REITs conduct repurchases evenly between financial statement filings.
On the date of the liquidity event or latest share value update, we estimate the market value of non-affiliated investors' non-traded REIT investments as the product of the liquidity event price and the number of shares held by non-affiliates. 10 Analysis of press releases and historical pricing data yields the liquidity event date and the liquidity event share price.
Constructing investor cash flows into and out of non-traded REITs allows us to directly compare the returns that investors have realized versus an alternative investment of similar risks characteristics. We determine the traded REIT liquidation value to compare with the non-traded REIT value by assuming investors had instead invested the same cash flows on the same dates in a traded REIT mutual fund as they invested in each non-traded REIT. To evaluate returns to non-traded REIT investments, we compare the liquidation value of each non-traded REIT to the traded REIT liquidation value, and compute the annualized internal rate of return on the non-traded REIT and traded REIT investments.
III. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we provide returns-based evidence that non-traded REITs have dramatically underperformed investments in traded REITs. As a consequence of nontraded REIT's lack of timely mark-to-market valuations and transaction data, we focus our analysis on non-traded REITs that have permitted investors to sell all their shares in a liquid secondary market through listing, merger or acquisition.
a. Main results
When selecting a return benchmark against which non-traded REITs' performance may be judged, we consider an investor's hypothetical investment in a passive, low-fee mutual fund, the Vanguard REIT Index Fund (VGSIX). 11 This mutual fund invests in a diversified portfolio of traded REITs. This investable and passive benchmark is preferable to an appraisal-based index for three reasons. First, an appraisal-based index is un- 10 We use the shares held by unaffiliated investors as of the SEC filing immediately preceding the liquidity event date. 11 We use returns to Vanguard investor-class shares, not admiral-class share. Although admiral-class shares have lower expenses, the $10,000 investment minimum is above the typical minimum purchase amounts of $1,000 to $2,500 set forth in offering documents. Investing in the lower fee Admiral-class shares would increase the magnitude of losses we report to investing in non-traded REITs.
investable, making it impossible to construct a true opportunity cost that corresponds to the exact timing of investments in non-traded REITs. Second, the returns to the Vanguard REIT Index Fund reflect actual investment performance after accounting for all fees and transactions costs. Third, appraisal-based indexes are known to incorporate value-relevant information with a lag compared to the prices of traded REITs (Giliberto [1993] and Gyourko and Keim [1992] ).
12 Table 2 69 of the 81 non-traded REITs in Table 2 suffer shortfalls relative to the traded REIT portfolio. Under the null hypothesis that non-traded REITs do not produce inferior returns compared to the traded REIT index, positive shortfalls are equally likely as negative shortfalls. The table reports at the bottom of the fourth column the probability, under the null hypothesis, that the number of positive shortfalls observed is at least 69 out of 81. This probability is calculated as
, where x is the number of positive shortfalls observed in the sample, n is the sample size, and p is the probability of a positive shortfall and equals 0.5 under the null hypothesis. The p-value of observing 69 or more positive shortfalls is less than 0.000 under the null hypothesis, confirming that non-traded REITs systematically underperform the benchmark. Table 3 expands the shortfall analysis by presenting the internal rates of return (IRRs) to the non-traded REITs and the traded REITs. To calculate the non-traded REIT IRRs, we solve for the rate of return that equates the present value of the non-traded REITs investments with that of the liquidation amount. The procedure is the same for calculating the traded REIT IRR, where the final cash flow is the traded REIT amount instead of the non-traded REIT liquidation amount. Since the non-traded REITs differ in size and the number of years in existence, the IRR analysis augments the shortfall analysis by providing estimates of annual return differences between the non-traded REITs and the traded REITs, which speaks to the economic significance of the shortfalls. Table 3 presents annualized IRRs for the sample non-traded REITs and the traded REITs. Consistent with the NPV results presented in Table 2 , the traded REIT IRR is greater than the non-traded REIT IRR for 69 of the 81 sample funds. The average non-traded REIT IRR is 6.3%, compared to 11.6% for the traded REITs. The non-traded REIT IRRs range from -14.7% to 36.8%, with an interquartile range of 6.4% (3.0% to 9.4%).
We calculate the aggregate IRR of the 81 non-traded REITs by combining all nonaffiliated investors' cash flows across the non-traded REITs into a single stream of cash flows from June 1990 to April 2015. When a non-traded REIT has a liquidity event or at the latest share value update, we treat the market value of that non-traded REIT as a cash flow returned to investors. The IRR of the aggregated non-traded REIT sample is 4.0%.
The same cash flow stream applied to a diversified, liquid portfolio of traded REITs would have generated an IRR of 11.3%. In other words, investors in a liquid, diversified portfolio of traded REITs that exposes investors to the same underlying real estate market as the non-traded REITs received returns of 11.3% per year in comparison to the 4.0% returns earned in the non-traded REITs. The variability of IRRs presented in Table 3 provides ex-post evidence that nontraded REITs expose investors to considerable risk. The non-traded REIT IRRs have a 9.4% standard deviation, compared to 6.6% for the traded REIT IRRs. The distribution of ex-post realized returns is in stark contrast to claims that non-traded REITs are less volatile investments than traded REITs.
Non-Traded REITs' underlying risk derives from their real estate assets and financing structure. The apparent lack of volatility in non-traded REITs and appraisal based indices results from the lack of transactions prices which only masks the true volatility of Traded REIT valuations reflect value-relevant information that is incorporated in appraisaldriven indices with a lag (Giliberto [1993] and Gyourko and Keim [1992] ).
That non-traded REITs result in lower average returns than the traded REIT mutual fund is glaring for two reasons. First, unlike the traded REIT fund that provides daily bidirectional liquidity at its reported NAV, the sample non-traded REITs offer virtually no secondary market liquidity prior to their liquidity event, apart from their very limited SRPs.
To compensate investors for their illiquidity, non-traded REITs returns should be higher than traded REITs. As a point of comparison, Lin, Wang, and Wu (2011) estimate that bond market investors require an additional return of approximately 4% annually as compensation for illiquidity. Second, for inclusion in our sample, a non-traded REIT must have undergone a liquidity event. Typically, only the most successful non-traded REITs become listed, merged or acquired so our sample is biased towards the most successful non-traded REITs and omits those that have suffered worse performance. For both of these reasons, our findings understate the true magnitude of non-traded REIT underperformance compared to traded REITs.
b. Contribution of up-front fees to shortfalls
As we highlighted in Table 1 , non-traded REITs charge high upfront fees which reduce the amount of investor capital that goes toward purchasing portfolio properties.
Non-traded REIT offerings are sold primarily to retail investors through an affiliated dealer-manager. The REIT compensates the dealer-manager with commissions that are large percentages of the offering proceeds. These commissions drastically reduce the investors' capital allocated to the acquisition of properties. Across the companies in our sample, selling commissions ranges from 1.5% to 8.0% and the average is 6.8%.
We next assess the contribution of the up-front fees to the observed underperformance of non-traded REITs. For each non-traded REIT, we determine the fees paid by unaffiliated investors when they purchase shares through offerings and the fees charged through DRP share purchases. Table 4 lists the fees for each of the sample nontraded REITs.
14 The fourth column of Table 4 presents the upfront fees paid by unaffiliated investors at the time they acquire non-traded REIT shares. Across the full sample, investors paid $14.4 billion in upfront fees, the majority of which compensated brokers. The fifth column presents the future value of the fees, computed under the assumption that they are invested in the traded REIT fund until the non-traded REIT's liquidation date. Across the sample, upfront fees charged to investors total $25.3 billion after including the opportunity cost of investing those dollars in the non-traded REITs. Given the cumulative investor shortfall of $45.5 billion, upfront fees contribute to 56% of the total shortfall.
Clearly the large upfront fees charged to investors are significant drivers of nontraded REITs' underperformance relative to the traded REITs. The upfront fees account for over half of the shortfall, but a significant portion remains. For 50 of the 81 sample funds, the shortfall estimates are larger than the future value of upfront fees. Under the null hypothesis that these upfront fees account for the entire underperformance, the estimated shortfalls are equally likely to be greater than and less than the future values of the upfront fees. Under the null hypothesis, the probability of observing 50 or more shortfalls that are larger than the portion attributable to upfront fees in a sample of 81 is 1.3%. These results support the conclusion that upfront fees are a significant determinant, but not the only driver of, non-traded REIT underperformance. We next discuss the role of conflicts of interest and the impact they have on realized returns. 16 That individual also acted as the advisor and was the sole owner of both the advisory firm and dealer-manager. In his sole and absolute discretion, the REIT invested exclusively in loans identified by another company which he owned. As a result, Desert Capital REIT's corporate structure had absolutely no checks and balances since this single individual controlled the company's investment decisions through his role as the advisor, chaired the board of directors and held the REIT's most powerful management positions, and was the sole beneficiary of the loan originations that comprise the REIT's loan portfolio. As a result of these conflicts of interest, Desert Capital REIT held an undiversified portfolio concentrated primarily in Nevada construction loans which suffered heavy losses during the financial crisis and forced Desert Capital REIT into bankruptcy.
b. Analysis of fees paid to affiliated parties and lack of institutional ownership
Selection of the advisor and property manager are among REITs' most important organizational decisions. The advisor performs portfolio investment functions, including the acquisition of investments, and the property manager oversees the operation of those portfolio properties. Each of these functions may be performed "internally" by REIT employees or "externally." In non-traded REITs, external doesn't mean "arms-length" or "independent"; it means owned by the same people who own the sponsor that controls the REIT management decision-making.
All of the sample non-traded REITs initially select firms affiliated with the sponsor to conduct their portfolio investment and advisor roles. Fees paid to external advisors are based on assets under management and additional incentive fees are based on performance.
These fee structures may create conflicting incentives with those of REIT shareholders. Analysis of the regulatory filings reveals that, from inception, the sample non-traded REITs select sponsor-affiliated advisors and portfolio managers. For this analysis, we focus on the 18 sample firms that list their shares on major U.S. exchanges since we observed only the combined entities following mergers and acquisitions. Table 5 presents the filing, internalization, and first institutional ownership dates for the 18 non-traded REITs that listed on U.S. exchanges. Of the 18 sample non-traded REITs to list on an exchange, 13 severed their advisory and management relationship with sponsor affiliated firms and each of those 13 did so on or before the listing date. This pattern suggests capital markets view management that is independent of the sponsor and accountable only to the REIT's investors as important. Institutional investors tend to invest only after non-traded REITs' exchange listing. Among the three sample observations where institutions invest in non-traded REITs prior to an exchange listing, the acquisitions took place only after the internalization of advisory and management roles. These patterns are consistent with the view that among non-traded REITs, institutional investors do not function as activist investors capable of controlling conflicts of interest that arise through the use of sponsor-affiliated advisors and managers.
If the conflicts of interest in non-traded REIT organizational structures are harmful to investors, then we would expect to observe the organizational changes that ameliorate the conflicts prior to a public listing or institutional investment documented in Table 5 . The immediate beneficial impact of those organizational changes can be seen in reductions in expenses paid for advisory and management purposes and increases in operating efficiency of non-traded REITs around the year in which they list. The expense categories we analyze are: property operating expenses, general and administrative expenses, total operating expenses, and management expenses paid to affiliated parties. For comparison, we normalize each non-traded REIT's expenses by its revenue. Around the internalization of advisory and management functions, REIT expenses shift from the category "management expenses paid to affiliates" to "general and administrative expenses." If expenses paid to affiliates exceed those paid to internal managers, then the net effect should be a decline in overall fees. Table 6 presents the non-traded REITs' average annual expenses normalized by revenues around their exchange listings. Given the large overlap between firms that list and internalize in the same year, we are not able to isolate changes around each of those events. Table 6 presents the average expenses in the listing year and the prior and subsequent years. The next column presents the change in the expenses. Around listings, expenses drop significantly. General and Administrative expenses (as a fraction of revenue) increase by 0.8% around the listing, which is attributable to the internalization of management and advisory functions. This is consistent with the corresponding reduction in management expenses paid to affiliates, which decline by a statistically significant 3.2%. Overall, operating expenses decline by an average of 9.0% of revenues around the exchange listing, and the decline is statistically significant at standard levels. The overall patterns are consistent with the view that on average, payments to affiliates prior to the exchange listing exceed the cost structure required to operate the REIT. As evidence, total expenses decline by 9.0% around the listing, which is driven by the 3.2% decline in management expenses paid to affiliates and a corresponding, but smaller, increase in general and administrative expenses as these functions are transferred to internal personnel. These patterns suggest that some combination of a liquid secondary market for the shares, institutional ownership, and reduced influence of sponsor-affiliated service providers corresponds to lower expenses, and support the findings that non-traded REIT underperformance stems from the conjunction of their high upfront fees and their extraordinary conflicts of interest.
c. Returns to first versus last round investments
Many non-traded REITs conduct multiple rounds of equity offerings. Given the conflicts of interest permeating their structure, and the absence of the discipline and monitoring imposed by institutional owners and an active secondary market for shares, conflicts may arise between early and late round investors in non-traded REITs. For example, in cases where the non-traded REIT has been successful, a portion of that wealth is transferred from the initial investors to late round investors if those investors are offered shares at the same share price as early investors. Conversely, in cases where the firm has experienced losses, late round investors will be diluted and their capital used to offset cumulative losses if late investors pay the same share price as early investors.
Using the offering data collected from SEC filings, we determine that 41 of the 81 sample non-traded REITs conducted multiple, non-overlapping equity offerings. Using the same methodology described in Section 2.b., we compute the annualized returns for first and last round investors for each of those 41 non-traded REITs. Table 7 presents the dates of the multiple offerings (effective and closing dates), as well as the annualized internal rates of return for both the first and last round investors. The final column presents the return for all investors, and matches the numbers reported in Table 3 .
Scanning the right-most columns of Table 7 reveals that the returns to first and last round investors tend to be similar, and consistent with the total IRR across all investments.
However, when the total IRR is negative, last round investments are lower than the first round. This pattern is consistent with the interpretation that last round investors subsidize the wealth of the first round investors. If the non-traded REIT is too slow to mark-down declining property values, the estimated net asset values may be over-stated, to the detriment of late round investors. Conversely, among non-traded REITs having the highest positive total returns, the last round investors tend to experience returns that are higher than those of the first-round investors. This pattern is consistent with the transfer of wealth from early investors in successful non-traded REITs to late-round investors and seems particularly nefarious. To illustrate the relation between first and last round investor returns, Figure 2 presents the average rate of return to the last round investors minus the return to the first 
V. Conclusions
We document significantly lower returns to non-traded REIT investors in 81 nontraded REITs compared to the returns they would have earned in a portfolio of traded REITs. We estimate that non-traded REITs underperform the traded REITs by approximately 7.3% annually. Our estimates of the dollar losses from investing in nontraded REITs instead of the traded REITs exceed $45.4 billion on the liquidation dates or latest share value update. These estimates understate non-traded REITs' true underperformance since non-traded REITs are so illiquid that investors should receive a higher average return for investing in non-traded REITs compared to the traded REITs.
Returns to non-traded REIT investors are negatively impacted by the large up-front fees and the conflicts of interest that permeate the non-traded REIT structure. We estimate that approximately 56% of the wealth losses to non-traded REIT investors, where losses represent the wealth relative to the benchmark, are attributable to the up-front fees charged that primarily compensate the distribution agents. Non-traded REITs' operating performance, which suffers from high fees paid to related parties for management and advisement, also contributes to the investment underperformance. Unlike publicly traded $5,231,596,032 $9,910,977,536 $6,466,641,920 *Healthcare Trust of America, Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Retail Properties of America, and Whitestone REIT each converted their non-traded common stock to listed common stock through a series of four partial liquidation events. We use all of the partial liquidations, but only present the final liquidation date in the table.
